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Abstract
It is generally accepted that quantum mechanics entails a revision of the classical propo-
sitional calculus as a consequence of its physical content. However, the universal claim ac-
cording to which a new quantum logic is indispensable in order to model the propositions of
every quantum theory is challenged. In the present essay we critically discuss this claim by
showing that classical logic can be rehabilitated in a quantum context by taking into account
Bohmian mechanics. It will be argued, indeed, that such a theoretical framework provides
the necessary conceptual tools to reintroduce a classical logic of experimental propositions
in virtue of its clear metaphysical picture and its theory of measurement. More precisely, it
will be showed that the rehabilitation of a classical propositional calculus is a consequence
of the primitive ontology of the theory, a fact which is not yet sufficiently recognized in the
literature concerning Bohmian mechanics. This work aims to fill this gap.
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1 Introduction: The Relation Between Logic and Mechanics
The General Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics1 (QM), the pillars of contempo-
rary physics, are our most accurate answers to the questions concerning the inherent nature of
spacetime and matter respectively, changing the conception of the world provided by classical
gravitational theories and Classical Mechanics (CM). Interestingly, Einstein’s theory not only
established that gravity is related to spacetime’s curvature, but also that Euclidean geometry
is not the correct mathematical theory in order to represent the physical world, being Rieman-
nian geometry the appropriate framework to be adopted in General Relativity. Similarly, QM
describes atoms and molecules and their dynamical behavior in a way that drastically changed
our conception of reality provided by classical physics, speaking about intrinsically indetermi-
nate systems, non-local interactions and superpositions; in addition, it even suggests a revision
of classical logic. More precisely, the physical content of QM entails that the logical structure
of the theory is not conformed to the laws of classical propositional calculus, as systematically
shown for the first time in Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936)2—such a result had a notable echo,
opening new research programs concerning not only the logic of QM (cf. Reichenbach (1944),
Mackey (1957), Finkelstein (1963), Kochen and Specker (1965), Jauch and Piron (1969), see
Jammer (1974) Chapter 8 for a historical perspective), but also regarding the nature of logic
itself and its empirical status (cf. notably Quine (1951), Putnam (1968), Dummett (1976), Bell
and Hallett (1982), Weingartner (2004), Bacciagaluppi (2009)).3
In this paper we will be concerned with a precise question: does quantum physics necessarily
implies a revision of classical logic? Alternatively stated, we will ask whether classical logic must
be abandoned in the quantum realm or if there are quantum theories which allow to retain a
classical propositional calculus.4
1In the present essay “Quantum Mechanics” refers to the standard (or textbook) formulation of quantum
theory.
2The core idea of this paper, i.e. that the propositions of quantum theory do not conform to classical propo-
sitional logic, is also contained in embryonic form in von Neumann’s monograph Mathematische Grundlagen der
Quantenmechanik appeared earlier in 1932. Interestingly, the idea that QM may implement logics different from
the classical propositional calculus circulated before Birkhoff and von Neumann paper. For instance, in 1931
the Polish logician Zygmunt Zawirski proposed to apply a three-valued logic to quantum theory, starting from
considerations about the wave-particle duality and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Furthermore, in 1933
Fritz Zwicky suggested that QM rejects the law of excluded-middle. For historical details see Jammer (1974),
Chapter 8. However, Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) is generally considered the founding text of quantum
logic, and here I will follow this tradition.
3For space reasons I will not enter into the latter debate, which is orthogonal to the aim of the present essay.
4In the present essay I will be concerned only with propositional calculus in the context of non-relativistic
QM; thus, first order logic and higher order logics will not be discussed, as well as the logic of relativistic quantum
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In order to begin our investigation, it is opportune to explain what is the relation between
logic and mechanics, which is algebraic in essence. It is a well known fact that classical propo-
sitional logic is equivalent to a Boolean algebra where propositions (atomic and complex) have
truth values “true” and “false” (or 1 and 0), and the main operations among them are con-
junction “∧”, disjunction “∨” and negation “¬”, the only unary operation. From these logical
connectives one can introduce secondary operations, as for instance the material implication
“−→”, the exclusive or “⊕” and logical equivalence “←→”.5 Furthermore, it is important for our
discussion to underline that the laws of propositional logic include commutativity, associativity,
identity and distributivity with respect to ∧ and ∨.
Analogously, the algebraic structure underlying classical mechanics is Boolean as well, being
commutative, distributive and associative; in this context the logical operations of conjunction,
disjunction and negation are replaced respectively by multiplication, addition and complemen-
tation among the variables of the theory. This fact has an interesting physical significance,
since the variables associated to magnitudes of physical systems can be added and multiplied
together—i.e. one can sum and multiply measurement results. Both propositional logic and
classical mechanics, thus, generate a complemented Boolean lattice; from this fact it follows
that the observable algebra of CM “is isomorphic to a Boolean algebra of propositions with
(∧,∨,¬)” (David (2015), p. 79).6 Therefore, it is possible to formally characterize the state of
a physical system via logical propositions which can assume the truth values “true” or “false”—
depending whether such statements describe true or false state of affairs concerning the system
under consideration (cf. Jaeger (2009), p. 61)—and to perform logical operations among propo-
sitions via the connectives (∧,∨,¬). It is worth noting that in the context of CM it is always
determined whether a system instantiates a given property or not; alternatively stated, every
logical proposition about physical systems is either true or false, and hence in CM the principle
of semantic bivalence holds (for more details cf. Bub (2007), p. 642, Dalla Chiara and Giuntini
(2002), p. 130).
Taking instead into account the mathematical structure and the physical content of stan-
dard QM, the classical propositional calculus is no longer appropriate to represent the logic
of quantum propositions, since quantum theory does not share the same algebraic features
of classical mechanics. In particular, the algebra of quantum observables is non-commutative
and from a logical perspective generates a non-distributive orthocomplemented lattice, which
is non-Boolean. Looking at the vast literature on quantum logic, it is possible to note that
currently there exists a multitude of different quantum logical systems, but in this essay we will
stick to the standard approach contained in Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), which will be
introduced in the next section.
Recalling what has been said above, the formal structure and the physical content of QM
triggered vivid discussions about the necessity of a new kind of logic in order to understand
what the theory says about the world, and hence, to comprehend how the microphysical realm
behaves. Nonetheless, it should be noted in the first place that standard quantum theory is
affected by severe conceptual and technical issues, e.g. the measurement problem, the lack of a
physically satisfactory explanation of the wave function collapse, the presence of ill-defined terms
within the axioms of the theory, etc. (cf. Bell (1987), Maudlin (1995a), Bricmont (2016)). Since
theories.
5For convenience, in this essay I will adopt the triple (∧,∨,¬) as a basis of connectives. However, the choice
of the basis is not unique.
6Referring to this, Beltrametti more explicitly claims that “Boolean algebras are algebraic models of classical
logic (more specifically of classical propositional calculus) with the algebraic operations of meet (∧) and join
(∨) corresponding to the logical connectives “and”, “or”, and the unary relation of orthocomplementation corre-
sponding to the logical negation. The rules and tautologies of classical logic have their counterpart in equations
and identities of Boolean algebras” (Beltrametti (2004), p. 341).
3
Quantum Logic (QL) rests upon the very same formalism of QM, many authors argued that it
does not have the necessary tools in order to provide solutions to such foundational issues, as for
instance Bacciagaluppi (2009) and Dalla Chiara and Giuntini (2002).7 Referring to this, several
strategies have been proposed to solve the conceptual and technical conundra of standard QM,
e.g. to modify the formalism of the theory, a path followed by the spontaneous collapse theories
(cf. Bassi and Ghirardi (2003)), to provide new interpretations of the quantum formalism, as
done by Everett’s relative state formulation (Everett (1957)), the many world interpretation
(Wallace (2012)) or more recently by Rovelli’s relational mechanics (Rovelli (1996)), or to add
variables to the quantum formalism, as done in Bohmian Mechanics (BM) (Dürr et al. (2013)).
Here we will be concerned with the latter theory.
More specifically, the principal aim of the present work is to show that it is not necessarily
true that QL is indispensable in every quantum theory, or better, that quantum physics neces-
sarily entails a revision of classical logic. It is not my intention to claim that QL is not needed
(or it is useless) to account for the physical content of standard non-relativistic QM, but rather,
I will challenge that a new quantum logic is indispensable in order to model the propositions
in the context of every conceivable quantum theory. In this paper it will be showed, indeed,
that taking into account BM, a theory implementing an ontology of particles in motion in
three-dimensional physical space, it is possible to restore a classical interpretation of the logical
connectives. The classical logical structure of such a theoretical framework, it will be argued,
is another remarkable consequence of the clear ontology of the theory, a fact which is not yet
sufficiently recognized in the literature concerning BM. The present work, then, aims to fill this
gap.
The essay is structured as follows: in Section 2 I will introduce the standard approach
to quantum logic introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann, whereas in Section 3 Bohmian
mechanics will be presented in some detail, focusing in particular on its metaphysics and its
theory of measurement. In this manner, I will be able to explain in Section 4 the reasons for
which in BM logical connectives retain their classical interpretation, showing that there exists
a quantum theory with an underlying classical logical structure. This fact, in turn, implies that
the universal claim for which quantum physics entails a revision of classical logic is not always
true. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Quantum Logic in a Nutshell
The principal aim of Birkhoff and von Neumann’s founding essay of quantum logic was to “dis-
cover what logical structures one may hope to find in physical theories which, like quantum
mechanics, do not conform to classical logic” (Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), p. 823). The
expression quantum logic in this paper must be clarified, since it refers to a quantum proposi-
tional calculus in the form of a “calculus of linear subspaces with respect to set products, linear
sums, and orthogonal complements” which “resembles the usual calculus of propositions with
respect to and, or, and not” (ibid.), where the logical propositions are associated to measure-
ments, tests on quantum systems.8 Let us now explain the reasons for which quantum theory
does not conform to classical logic, recalling some of its well-known mathematical features.9
In the first place, QM relies on a non-commutative algebraic structure, contrary to the case of
7In what follows I will not discuss the useful practical applications of QL in the field of quantum information
and computation.
8Cf. Dalla Chiara and Giuntini (2002) and Dalla Chiara et al. (2004) for a systematic introduction to various
forms of quantum logics, and to Engesser et al. (2009) for historical and philosophical discussions on the topic.
9For details on the mathematical structure of QM and its physical content the reader may refer e.g. to Sakurai
(1994), and Griffiths (2014). In this essay, it is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with QM and QL.
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classical mechanics. Indeed, quantum observables10 generally do not commute, i.e. for any pair
of operators A,B we have [A,B] = AB−BA 6= 0. From a physical perspective this fact entails
that if one performs a measurement of A followed by a measurement of B on a quantum system,
in general one will obtain different results inverting the order of these observations. Moreover, in
virtue of the non-commutative structure of quantum theory, to measure an operator C = A+B
is not typically equivalent to measure A and B independently and then add the respective
results, since A,B will be in general incompatible (cf. David (2015), p. 77). This algebraic fact
of QM constitutes the formal basis to prove the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, a theorem of
quantum theory which reflects the operational inability to simultaneously measure the values
of incompatible operators with arbitrary precision. Such a result, in turn, is usually interpreted
ontologically in the sense that quantum system do not instantiate definite properties in non-
measurement situations (cf. Sakurai (1994)).
In the second place, another remarkable difference with respect to classical mechanics is
that quantum systems can be in superposition states as a consequence of the linearity of the
Schrödinger Equation (SE)—the fundamental dynamical law of QM—which for a single particle
reads:
i~
∂ψ
∂t
=
(
− ~
2
2m
∇2k + V
)
ψ = Hψ, (1)
whereH represents the Hamiltonian operator, defined as the sum of kinetic and potential energy
of the system at hand. More specifically, this algebraic property of (1) entails that if two wave
functions11 ψ1, ψ2 are both possible solutions of the same Schödinger equation, then their linear
combination (superposition)
ψs = αψ1 + βψ2 (2)
is still a solution of the same SE—|α|2, |β|2 (with α, β ∈ C) represent the probabilities to find
the system in ψ1, ψ2 respectively. Notably, the new superposed state ψs is also a consistent
representation of the system. Since in experimental situations such superpositions are never
revealed, QM prescribes that the interaction between the measured system and the measurement
apparatus causes the suppression of the Schrödinger evolution, collapsing stochastically the wave
function in one of the possible eigenstates of the measured observable. The probability to find
the system in one of such states is given by the Born’s rule. It is in the measurement process,
then, that the inherently stochastic character of quantum theory emerges vigorously, denying
any form of causality or determinism.
Given the axioms of QM, Birkhoff and von Neumann showed how the physical content of
this theory does not conform to a classical logical structure. Their analysis begins by defining
quantum logical propositions as experimental propositions, i.e. statements affirming that a cer-
tain observable A (or a set of observables) measured on a quantum system has a given value ai
(or a sequence of values).12
10In QM properties of physical systems are represented by Hermitian operators A called observables. The
possible states in which the system can be found after the performance of measurement are the eigenstates of
A, and the corresponding values are the eigenvalues of A.
11In QM the wave function of a system provides the maximal information available about it.
12More precisely, the authors stress that both in classical and quantum mechanics observations of physical
systems are given by readings of experimental outcomes (x1, . . . , xn) of compatible measurements (µ1, . . . , µn).
The values (x1, . . . , xn) are elements of what the authors called the (x1, . . . , xn)-space, i.e. the “observation-
space” of the system in question, whose elements are all the possible combinations of results of the measurements
(µ1, . . . , µn); thus, the actual values (x1, . . . , xn) form a subset of such a space. Birkhoff and von Neumann,
then, defined the experimental propositions concerning a physical system as the subsets of the observation space
associated with it.
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Secondly, the authors underlined that in classical and quantum mechanics the states of
physical systems are mathematically represented by points in their state spaces—phase space
for the classical case, and Hilbert space H for the quantum case—which provide the maximal
information concerning the system. A point in phase space corresponds to the specification
of the position and momentum variables of a certain classical system, whereas in QM the
points of H are wave functions. The authors, then, find a connection between subsets of the
observation-space of a system and subsets of the Hilbert space, specifying that quantum exper-
imental proposition are mathematically represented by a closed linear subspace of H; this step
is crucial in order to obtain the quantum propositional calculus. More precisely, a proposition
p is associated with a subset P ⊂ H whose elements are all the pure states for which p is
true, hence, quantum logical propositions “are in bijective correspondence to closed subspaces
of the Hilbert space of the system” (Bacciagaluppi (2009), p. 55). Alternatively, we can say that
quantum mechanical operators correspond to propositions with “yes/no” (“true/false”) outcome
in a logical system as underlined by David (2015), p. 78:
An orthogonal projector P onto a linear subspace P ⊂ H is indeed the operator
associated to an observable that can take only the values 1 (and always 1 if the state
ψ ∈ P is in the subspace P ) or 0 (and always 0 if the state ψ ∈ P⊥ belongs to the
orthogonal subspace to P ). Thus we can consider that measuring the observable P
is equivalent to perform a test on the system, or to check the validity of a logical
proposition p on the system.
In order to properly define a propositional calculus for QM, one must define the logical oper-
ators for conjunction, disjunction and negation and the notion of logical implication. Following
Birkhoff and von Neumann, the procedure is rather simple:
1. The negation of a proposition p is defined by the authors as follows: “since all operators of
quantum mechanics are Hermitian, the mathematical representative of the negative of any
experimental proposition is the orthogonal complement of the mathematical representative
of the proposition itself” (Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), pp. 826-827). The orthogonal
complement P⊥ of the subspace P is the set whose elements are all the vectors orthogonal
to the elements of P . From a physical perspective such an orthogonal complement satisfies
the following property: given a subset P ⊂ H and a pure state ψ, ψ(P ) = 1 iff ψ(P⊥) = 0
and ψ(P ) = 0 iff ψ(P⊥) = 1. As Dalla Chiara and Giuntini underline, “ψ assigns
to an event probability 1 (0, respectively) iff ψ assigns to the orthocomplement of P
[notation adapted] probability 0 (1, respectively). As a consequence, one is dealing with
an operation that inverts the two extreme probability-values, which naturally correspond
to the truth-values truth and falsity (similarly to the classical truth-table of negation)”
(Dalla Chiara and Giuntini (2002), p. 132).
2. Concerning the conjunction, Birkhoff and von Neumann notice that one can retain the
very same set-theoretical interpretation as the classical conjunction, since the intersection
of two closed subspaces P,Q ⊂ H is still a closed subspace. Thus, one maintains the usual
meaning for the conjunction: the pure state ψ verifies P ∩Q iff ψ verifies both P and Q.
Thus, quantum logic does not introduce a new logical operator for the conjunction.
3. Contrary to the previous case, the logical operator for disjunction cannot be represented
by the set-theoretic union, since the set-theoretical union of the two subspaces P,Q will
not be in general a subspace, thus, it is not an experimental proposition. Therefore, in
QL one introduces the quantum logical disjunction as the the closed span of the subspaces
P,Q, which is an experimental proposition. Such a statement corresponds to the “smallest
closed subspace containing both P and Q” (Bacciagaluppi (2009), p. 55).
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4. The logical implication is defined by set theoretical inclusion: given two experimental
propositions p and q, p implies q, means that whenever one predicts p with certainty,
one can predict also q with certainty, and this is equivalent to state that p is a subset of
q. This fact is particularly important since the authors showed that “it is algebraically
reasonable to try to correlate physical qualities with subsets of phase-space” and thus,
“physical qualities attributable to any physical system form a partially ordered system”
(Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), p. 828, notation adapted).
In this manner we have defined a propositional calculus for quantum experimental proposi-
tions, which generates an orthocomplemented lattice. The remarkable fact about this quantum
logic—and the crucial difference with respect to the logic associated with experimental propo-
sitions of classical mechanics—is the failure of the distributive law. It is a well-known fact that
such a law holds in the propositional calculus underlying classical mechanics in virtue of the
commutative algebra of classical observables. However, conjunction and disjunction are not
distributive in the context of QL, meaning that given three propositions p, q and r the logical
law
p ∧ (q ∨ r)←→ (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) (3)
does not hold.13 Let us explain this fact with a simple example taken from Dalla Chiara and
Giuntini (2002). These authors claim that distributivity fails in quantum logic because of (i)
the peculiar behavior of the quantum disjunction—which may be true although neither of the
member is true in virtue of the linearity of (1)—and (ii) the non-commutativity of quantum
observables. More concretely, let us suppose to consider a 1/2−spin particle, let’s say an
electron that has spin up along the x axis. From QM we know that there are only two possible
spin states in which a particle can be found in each axis after a spin measurement, namely
either in the up or in the down state. Furthermore, since spin operators along different axis
do not commute, being incompatible observables—[Sx, Sy] = [Sx, Sz] = [Sy, Sz] 6= 0—they
cannot be simultaneously measured. Then, as a consequence of the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle, “both propositions “spiny is up” and “spiny is down” shall be strongly undetermined.
However, the disjunction “either spiny is up or spiny is down” must be true” (Dalla Chiara
and Giuntini (2002), pp. 133-134), and the same holds for the case of spin in the z direction.
Therefore, if p in (3) represents the proposition “the electron has x-spin up”, q the proposition
“the electron has y-spin up” and r the proposition ‘the electron has y-spin down”, it is possible
to see that the first part of (3) express a true statement—i.e. p ∧ (q ∨ r) = 1—whereas (p ∧ q)
and (p ∧ r) are both false in virtue of the incompatibility between the spin operators among
different axes, implying that the second part of the distributive law asserts a false statement,
i.e. (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) = 0. Consequently, this law fails in the context of quantum theory, since
we have p ∧ (q ∨ r) = 1←→ (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) = 0.
As we have seen, Birkhoff and von Neumann claimed that a quantum logic should be
introduced since the physical content of QM implies a violation of classical logical laws and a
redefinition of some logical operations among propositions. After the publication of this paper,
as already stated in the previous section, research in quantum logic gathered notable attention
and it is now a well-established sub-discipline in the foundational research in quantum physics.14
However, it must be underlined that QL, resting on the mathematical structure of QM, cannot
solve the cogent problems which affect quantum theory itself, as for instance the quantum
13In the context of quantum logic, distributivity must be replaced by a weaker law: (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) −→
(p ∧ (q ∨ r)).
14For historical clarity it must be said that Birkhoff and von Neumann’s paper did not obtain much attention
immediately after its publication, but it became a central work in quantum foundations from the fifties.
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measurement problem, or the incompatibility among the dynamical laws of the theory. This
conclusion is now widespread among experts as exemplified e.g. by Bacciagaluppi (2009) and
Dalla Chiara and Giuntini (2002). Referring to this, the latter authors stated explicitly that
“quantum logics are not to be regarded as a kind of “clue”, capable of solving the main physical
and epistemological difficulties of QT [quantum theory]. This was perhaps an illusion of some
pioneering workers in quantum logic” (Dalla Chiara and Giuntini (2002), p. 225).
In the remainder of this essay, we shall concentrate on Bohmian mechanics, a quantum
theory where the usual problems of non-relativistic QM are solved via the introduction of a
clear particle ontology. It will be shown that in virtue of such a metaphysical picture, this
theory presents a classical logical structure. Thus, we will see that quantum physics does not
necessarily entails a revision of classical propositional calculus.
3 Bohmian Mechanics, Observables and Quantum Measurements
Bohmian mechanics is a quantum theory implementing a Primitive Ontology (PO) of point-
particles moving along deterministic trajectories in physical space. The primitive ontology of a
theory T defines the fundamental entities of T , those objects which cannot be further analyzed
and/or defined in terms of more elementary notions contained in the theory’s vocabulary. These
entities are the variables appearing in T ’s equations provided with a direct physical meaning,
i.e. referring to real objects precisely localized and moving in physical space, and explain—
together with the dynamical laws of the theory under consideration—the macroscopic world
surrounding us. Thus, as we will see more clearly later on, physical phenomena are explained
in BM exclusively in terms of particles in motion in physical space (and ontologically reduced
to them).15 For the sake of precision and simplicity, in the remainder of the present work I
will focus exclusively on the version of BM contained in Dürr and Teufel (2009) and Dürr et al.
(2013), where the Bohmian particles are the only entities defined in space and time, and the
quantum mechanical wave function is considered an abstract nomological entity, not living in
3-dimensional space.16 In what follows, I will show that in virtue of its clear particle ontology
such a theoretical framework implements a classical logical structure. Alternatively stated, the
classical logical structure of BM is a consequence of its primitive ontology.
Bohmian mechanics provides a complete description of quantum systems via the intro-
duction of additional variables to the wave-function, i.e. the specification of particles’ posi-
tions. In this theory physical systems are represented by a couple (Q(t), ψ(t)), where Q(t) =
(Q1(t), . . . , QN (t)) describes the actual positions in space of a N -particle configuration at an
arbitrary time t, and the latter is the configuration’s wave function, which does not exhaust
the information concerning physical systems as in QM. Bohmian particles are always precisely
localized, hence, the corpuscles follow trajectories in physical space. Referring to this, the dy-
namics of BM is fully described by two equations of motion, one for the ψ-function, one for
the Bohmian particles. The former evolves in 3N -configuration space according to the unitary
evolution provided by (1), whereas the latter are governed by the so-called guidance equation:
dQk
dt
=
~
mk
Im
ψ∗∇kψ
ψ∗ψ
(Q1, . . . , QN ) = v
ψ
k (Q1, . . . , QN ). (4)
15The interested reader may refer to Allori (2013) and Esfeld (2014) for a more detailed explanation of the
notion of primitive ontology.
16Other versions of the theory maintain different positions concerning the metaphysical status of the ψ-
function; see notably Bohm (1952), Holland (1993) and Hubert and Romano (2018).
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From (4) it is clear that the particles’ velocity is a function of ψ: the guidance equation generates
a vector velocity field (see r.h.s.) which depends on the wave function, whose role is to guide
the motion of the particles in physical space on the one hand, and to determine the statistical
distribution of the particles’ positions on the other. Remarkably, since the velocity of the
particles is defined as the rate of change in time of their position, it is a secondary property
which can be ascribed to the Bohmian corpuscles.17
Finally, the Born’s distribution is preserved in BM, making its predictions empirically indis-
tinguishable with respect to those of QM. More precisely, to understand this result one should
take into consideration a crucial consequence of the Bohmian dynamics, i.e. equivariance: if at an
arbitrary initial time the initial particle distribution is given by the density ρ0(Q) = |ψ(Q, 0)|2,
the density at later times will be given by ρt(Q) = |ψ(Q, t)|2.18
3.1 The Bohmian Treatment of the Measurement Process
In order to present the Bohmian theory of measurement in a straightforward manner, let us
consider the very simple, idealized case of a wave function ψ in a superposition of two states
ψ1, ψ2 corresponding to the possible eigenstates of a two-valued operator O, with eigenvalues
“left” (L) and “right” (R):
ψ = c1ψ1 + c2ψ2, (5)
where c1, c2 ∈ C and |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1. Before the measurement’s performance, we assume that
the macroscopic experimental device used to measure O is in the ready state Φ0, i.e. in a state
pointing to a neutral direction, whereas the other admissible pointer’s positions will be Φ1 for
L (pointing to the left) and Φ2 for R (pointing to the right). From ordinary quantum theory
we know that system and apparatus are initially independent, i.e. described by a product wave
function; however, given the deterministic evolution provided by the Schrödinger equation we
obtain a macroscopic superposition:∑
i=1,2
ciψiΦ0 −→
∑
i=1,2
ciψiΦi. (6)
To tame this awkward feature of standard QM—which is the quantum measurement problem
mentioned in the previous sections—Bohmian mechanics provides a description of the measure-
ment process by specifying the trajectories of the individual particles composing both the system
and the classical apparatus. Indeed, according to this theoretical framework a measurement is
just an interaction between the system and the experimental device, and both are composed of
localized particles which evolve according to the laws (1)-(4).
Notably, in this theory a particular measurement situation is formally represented by a
couple (X,Y ) ∈ R3M×R3(N−M) where the former variable refers to the actual initialM -particle
configuration of the subsystem under consideration, and the latter to the actual configuration
of particle composing the environment, i.e. its complement formed by all the particles not in the
subsystem, including the particle configuration of the experimental device which will actually
register the measurement result. BM provides an algorithm to define the effective wave function
17It is worth stressing that although BM implements a corpuscular ontology, it is a non-classical theory since
it is explicitly non-local, as one may see from the r.h.s. of (4) (cf. Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chapter 8, Bricmont
(2016), Chapter 5).
18For the mathematical justification of this statement the reader should refer to Dürr et al. (2013), Chapter
2, Secs. 4-7. To this regard, it is also worth noting that BM restores also a classical interpretation of quantum
probabilities. These are manifestation of our ignorance about the exact positions of the Bohmian particles and
our operational inability to manipulate them. Thus, the maximum knowledge of particles’ configurations at our
disposal in BM is provided by |ψ|2.
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of the subsystem’s degrees of freedom, which corresponds to the usual quantum mechanical
wave function.19 In a nutshell, the system’s effective wave function ψt(x) is obtained from
the universal wave function Ψ = Ψ(x, y)—i.e. the wave function of the particle configuration
composing the entire universe—where x, y represent generic variables for the subsystem and its
complement respectively. The next step to define ψt(x) is to insert the actual configuration
of the environment at hand Yt into the wave function Ψ(x, y). In this manner we obtain the
so-called conditional wave function ψt(x) = Ψ(xt, Yt) of our subsystem’s degrees of freedom;
such a function obeys the Schrödinger equation only under the particular condition in which
the system is decoupled from its environment. This entails that the larger wave function must
have the following effective product form:
Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y) (7)
with Φ(y) and Ψ⊥(x, y) having macroscopically disjoint supports20 in the y-variables and Yt ∈
suppΦ(y). Thus, for all practical purposes one may not consider the empty branch of the wave
function Ψ⊥. When this condition is met, the subsystem’s conditional wave function is called
effective wave function.21
Having explained how BM defines subsystems’ wave functions, let us return to our example
taking into account Figure 1, which represents the three possible orientations of the macroscopic
pointer in physical space, and the relative support of the pointer’s wave function in configuration
space described a few lines above.
Φ0
Φ2Φ1
Physical Space Configuration Space
suppΦ1 suppΦ2
suppΦ0
19For technical details see Dürr et al. (2013), Chapter 2, and Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chapter 9.
20The support of a wave function is the domain in which it is non-zero. “The notions of support, separation of
supports, and disjointness of supports have to be taken with a grain of salt. The support of a Schrödinger wave
function is typically unbounded and consists of (nearly) the whole of configuration space. “Zero” has thus to be
replaced by “appropriately small” (in the sense that the square norm over the region in question is negligible).
Then, the precise requirement of macroscopic disjointness is that the overlap of the wave functions is extremely
small in the square norm over any macroscopic region”, Dürr and Teufel (2009), p. 174, footnote 1. In this
regard, it is interesting to note that the pointer’s wave function “is a macroscopic wave function, which can
be imagined as a “random” superposition of macroscopically many (≈ 1026) one-particle wave functions, with
support [footnote deleted] tightly concentrated around a region in configuration space (of ≈ 1026 particles) that
makes up a pointer in physical space pointing in some direction, i.e., defining some pointer position. So different
pointer positions belong to macroscopically disjoint wave functions, that is, wave functions whose supports are
macroscopically separated in configuration space” (ibid.).
21Referring to this, Passon notes that in measurement situations “the wavefunction of the measurement appara-
tus will in general be in a superposition state. The configuration however indicates the result of the measurement
which is actually realized. That part of the wavefunction which “guides” the particle(s) can be reasonably termed
the effective wavefunction. All the remaining parts can be ignored, since they are irrelevant for the particle dy-
namics. As a result of decoherence effects [...], the probability that they will produce interference effects with
the effective wavefunction is vanishingly small” (Passon (2018), p. 191).
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Fig. 1: Schematic representation of the three different possible directions of the pointer in physical
space (left) and the relative supports of the pointer’s wave function in configuration space (right).
As already stated, before the performance of the measurement at time t = 0, the macroscopic
pointer points in the neutral direction in the “ready” state and, consequently, the wave function
of the actual configuration of particle composing the experimental device has support Y0 ∈
suppΦ0. At this stage the system has not yet interacted with the experimental device, thus,
they are initially independent and described by a product wave function. The two other pointer
position wave functions, corresponding to the possible outcomes L and R respectively, are Φ1(y)
where Yt ∈ suppΦ1, and Φ2(y), Yt ∈ suppΦ2, as shown in Figure 2.
Φ0
Φ2Φ1
Physical Space
R
N−M
y
RM
x
Φ1
Φ0
Φ2
(X0; Y0)
Fig. 2: Schematic representation of the pointer pointing in the neutral direction in physical space
before the measurement, solid line. Dashed lines represent physically possible but not actualized
measurement outcomes (left). The relative support of the pointer’s wave function and particle
configuration describing the experimental situation before the measurement’s performance (right).
Running the experiment, the interaction between the system and the experimental device will
be governed exclusively by the dynamical evolution provided by (1) and (4). Since particles’
positions of the measured system and the experimental apparatus are always well-defined, the
measurement outcome will be also well-defined as a consequence of the theory’s formalism,
i.e. the final outcome is a function of (i) the initial conditions of the particles composing the
system and the experimental device, and (ii) the dynamical laws governing their behavior.
Hence, the configuration of particles (X0, Y0) will deterministically evolve at a successive time
t > t0 into another configuration (Xt, Yt), corresponding to one of the possible eigenstates of
the measured operator O, coupled with a definite state of the macroscopic experimental device,
which will point in a definite direction expressed explicitly by Yt.22 More precisely, after the
measurement, Yt will have a well-defined macroscopic support in the y-variable, i.e. either we
obtain Yt ∈ suppΦ1(y) or Yt ∈ suppΦ2(y), and the empty packet of the wave function can be
practically neglected. Suppose to find the outcome R, then, the macroscopic pointer will point
in the Φ2 direction, implying that Yt ∈ suppΦ2(y), as illustrated in Figure 3.
22For technical details about the Bohmian theory of measurement the reader may consult Dürr and Teufel
(2009), Chapter 9, Bohm (1952), Part II, Section 2 and Maudlin (1995b).
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Φ0
Φ2Φ1
Physical Space
R
N−M
y
RM
x
Φ1
Φ0
Φ2
(Xt; Yt)
Fig. 3: Schematic representation of the pointer pointing in the right direction in physical space,
meaning that the outcome R has been obtained, solid line (left). The relative support of the
pointer’s wave function and particle configuration describing the experimental result are shown on
the right. For practical purposes the empty branch of the wave function can be neglected.
Hence, according to BM, measurement results are simply defined as functions of the primitive
ontology of the theory and its dynamics. As Goldstein et al. (2012) said, “a statement like “the
experiment E has the outcome z” should mean that the PO of the apparatus indicates the value
z. For example, if the apparatus displays the outcome by a pointer pointing to a particular
position on a scale, what it means for the outcome to be z is that the matter of the pointer
is, according to the PO, in the configuration corresponding to z. Thus, the outcome Z is a
function of the PO, Z = f(PO)”.
From our simple presentation of the Bohmian theory of measurement, four remarks must
be emphasized:
1. In this theory there are no superpositions of particles in physical space, therefore the
physical situation described in (6) is avoided by construction. Consequently, macroscopic
superpositions are forbidden;
2. Measurement results are functions of the primitive ontology and its dynamical evolution
provided by the Schrödinger equation and the guiding equation. Thus, the individual
physical processes responsible for the macro-objectification of measurement outcomes are
independent from external observers;
3. Wave functions are not subjected to stochastic jumps: the wave function’s collapse loses
its fundamental role in the dynamics of the theory, being an effect of the interaction
between subsystem and environment. Hence, in BM observers never cause the result of a
given measurement.23
4. Operators are associated with experiments, not with genuine properties of physical sys-
tems, since every measurement outcome depends on the initial positions of the Bohmian
particles and the laws (1)-(4). Therefore, in BM only particles position are really observed
(Bell (1982), p. 996).
23For significant literature about the role of observers in BM the reader may refer to Bohm (1952), Dürr et al.
(2013), Dürr and Teufel (2009), Chapter 9, Bricmont (2016), Chapter 5, Passon (2018).
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3.2 Contextuality in Bohmian Mechanics
In the light of what has been stated above, we can say that in the context of BM the usual
quantum observables are reduced to position measurements; more precisely, observational out-
comes are ontologically dependent on the initial conditions of the experimental set-up—i.e. the
initial particle configuration of the measured system and the apparatus—and the dynamics of
the theory (cf. Dürr et al. (2004) in particular). It is not surprising, then, that BM is also a
contextual theory: quantum observables are not considered metaphysically genuine properties
of the particles, and their measurements do not reveal pre-existing values of such magnitudes.
This theory, therefore, conforms to the no-go theorems showing the contextuality of quantum
observables and the impossibility to complete QM with non-contextual hidden variables (cf.
Lazarovici et al. (2018)). Let us explain the latter point with an explicit example, taking into
account a spin measurement on a single particle along the z-axis.
Before the measurement of the z−spin, the system will be in general described by the
following state:
ψ(z)
(
| ↑〉+ | ↓〉
)
(8)
For the sake of simplicity I will assume that the wave function written above is symmetrical,
i.e. ψ(z) = ψ(−z), so that the nodal line showed in Figure 4 corresponds to the case in which
z = 0; such a nodal line cannot be crossed by Bohmian particles in virtue of (4). In the
figure below, H indicates the direction of the inhomogeneous magnetic field of the idealized
Stern-Gerlach apparatus we are considering, the circles represents schematically—and in a very
idealized way—the supports of the wave function.
(a) (b)
z
x x
z
H H
 (z)j "i
 (z)j #i
Initial position of the particle
 (z)j #i
 (z)j "i
0 0
Fig. 4: Schematic representation of the contextual nature of the property of spin in Bohmian
Mechanics. These picture are taken from Bricmont (2018).
In this scenario if we perform a spin measurement along the z axis we can obtain two
results: one given by | ↑〉, which in figure 4a follows the direction of H, and one given by | ↓〉,
which goes in the opposite direction. In our example, at the beginning of the measurement
the Bohmian particle is located above the nodal line, and therefore it necessarily will go up,
obtaining the state ψ(z)| ↑〉. Then, we will say that the particle “has z−spin up”. Remarkably,
if we reverse the direction of H leaving unaltered the initial position of the particle above the
nodal line, as in figure 4b, we will conclude that the particle will go up as well. However, this
time the particle travels in the opposite direction with respect to the H field, and we will say
that the particle “has z−spin down”. According to BM, thus, the initial configuration of the
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particle and the measuring apparatus—in combination with the dynamics of the theory—will
univocally determine the outcome. Hence, this measurement will not measure any pre-existing
spin property of the particle under consideration. Notably, in BM this conclusion has been
generalized to every quantum observable.
In sum, from our discussion it is possible to conclude that in the context of BM, every
proposition about quantum measurements must be translated into a statement concerning the
particles’ positions and their dynamics. This fact is crucial to demonstrate that the logical
structure underlying Bohmian mechanics is classical.
4 Classical Logic in Quantum Context
In the previous section we showed that in Bohmian mechanics measurement results are defined
as function of the PO of the theory. This fact allows us to leave aside considerations about
observables, since they do not refer to genuine properties of quantum systems—contrary to the
cases of classical and quantum mechanics—being merely associated with experiments. There-
fore, we need to concentrate uniquely on the particles’ positions, the exclusive genuine (and
the only measurable) property of Bohmian corpuscles. This entails, in turn, that logical (or
experimental) propositions must be statements concerning the locations of particles and noth-
ing else, given that such entities are the unique objects of the theory defined in physical space.
This fact marks an important difference also with respect to classical mechanics, since in that
context logical propositions assign a set of properties which are considered genuine attributes
of physical systems, although they are function of positions and momenta. On the contrary, in
BM suggests a minimal ontological commitment towards particles’ position and their change
in time, being particles’ location the unique inherent properties of such entities (cf. Goldstein
et al. (2005b,a), Esfeld et al. (2017)).
In addition, one must also define the truth conditions for logical statements in BM, i.e.
under what conditions a certain proposition is true or false. It is worth recalling that in
this theory objects are completely determined, meaning that there is an objective fact of the
matter—completely independent from external observers—establishing whether a certain par-
ticle instantiates a given property. Since in this theoretical framework every physical fact and
phenomenon is reduced ontologically to the motion of the Bohmian particles in space, we will
say that a logical proposition p has truth value “true” if and only if there exists a physical state
of affairs that makes p true; a proposition is false otherwise. NB: given that in BM there are
no superposition of particles, this theoretical framework maintains the principle of semantic
bivalence, since the corpuscles are precisely and uniquely localized in space. To argue that BM
has a classical logical structure, then, it is sufficient to show that in such a theory the logical
connectives (∧,∨,¬) maintain their classical interpretations. Let us then consider the following
cases:
• Classicality of ∧: Given two atomic propositions p, q, the complex proposition p ∧ q
is true in BM iff p and q are both true; this statement is false otherwise. Consequently,
a proposition with n conjuncts p1 ∧ p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pn is true if and only if every pi is true,
and false otherwise (i.e. there must be a state of affairs that makes every conjunct true).
Hence, the logical operator ∧ retains its classical meaning. For instance, the sentence “the
particle k has position qk and velocity vk” is true in BM iff it is the case that the particle
k is actually located in space at the position qk and if it has velocity vk. If one of these
two statements is false, the conjunction will be false as well. This case is not particularly
interesting, since also in standard QL the conjunction is defined as in classical logic, so the
meaning of this connective remain unaltered from the classical to the quantum transition.
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• Classicality of ∨: Given two atomic propositions p, q, the complex proposition p ∨
q is true in BM iff at least either p or q is true, i.e. there must be a state of affairs
that makes p or q true; this statement is false in the case in which both p and q are
not verified. Consequently, a proposition with n disjuncts p1 ∨ p2 ∨ · · · ∨ pn is true if
and only if at least one pi is true, and false otherwise. Hence, the logical operator ∨
retains its classical meaning. Contrary to QL, in Bohmian mechanics one does not have
to introduce a new operator for the quantum disjunction, since the primitive ontology
of BM is always exclusively located in one specific support of the quantum mechanical
wave function, as already underlined in the previous section. This fact ensures that its
evolution will evolve in only one of the macroscopically disjoint possible measurement
outcomes. As Bacciagaluppi clearly underlines “the configuration of the system is located
only in one of these different components, and this is already a matter of classical logic.
The cat is (classically) either alive or dead, because the particles that compose it are
(classically) either in the live component or the dead component of the quantum state.”
(Bacciagaluppi (2009), p. 72). Similarly, taking into account the previous example of the
spin measurement along the z-axis, the particle will have spin up or spin down in the case
in which it will be located above or under the symmetry line respectively. Hence, one
can model this experimental situation with a classical disjunction. This marks a notable
difference between BM and standard QM.
• Classicality of ¬: Given a proposition p, p is false in those cases in which it is not
verified, i.e. in cases in which there is a physical state of affairs that makes ¬p true.
Thus, also the logical operator “¬” maintains its classical meaning. For instance, the
negations of the sentences “the velocity of the particle i is v” and “the position of the
particle i is q” are expressed by the statements “the velocity of the particle i is not v” and
“the position of the particle i is not q” respectively, having positions and velocity of this
particle values different from v and q. In addition, let us consider how BM handles the case
of two-valued operators such as spin observables—recalling that these do not represent
genuine properties of Bohmian particles. In QL one models the possible outcomes of a
spin measurement as two different and complementary tests, suppose T for spin-up and
T⊥ for spin-down along a given axis, say z. Therefore, the negation of the proposition
“a certain system passed the test T with probability 1”, corresponds to the following
statement “the system passed with probability 1 the test T⊥, the orthogonal complement
of the test T ”. Such an interpretation can be retained in BM as well. In the context of
this theory to state that a particle i does not have z−spin-up is equivalent to assert that
i has not been found in a certain position in space corresponding to the location of the
detector associated with a certain state of the measured operator. Hence, the negation
of the proposition “the particle i has z−spin up” is translated into the statement “the
particle i is not at q”, where q is the position where the particle would have been found
if it had z−spin up. Furthermore, knowing that in spin measurements a particle will
be necessarily found either in the state spin-up or spin-down, in BM one will add the
information that the particle i has been found in another position corresponding to the
location of the detector associated with a the state “spin-down”. Thus, one can recover the
usual interpretation of negation as (ortho-)complementation as in the the logic of classical
and quantum mechanics. As a consequence, negation has the following properties also in
BM: (i) ¬¬p = p, (ii) p ∧ ¬p = 0 and (iii) p ∨ ¬p = 1.
From this discussion it is possible to claim that the logical operators in BM retain their
classical interpretation, and that complex propositions are formed with the usual logical con-
nectives; hence, we can conclude that the logic of propositions concerning the Bohmian particles
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is classical. As a direct consequence, the distributivity law holds in such a theory. In order
to discuss this fact, let us take into account the example already introduced in Section 2.
Considering the three propositions
• p = the particle i has x−spin-up;
• q = the particle i has y−spin-up;
• r = the particle i has y−spin-down,
we were able to show the failure of distributivity as follows. In the first place we assumed that
the particle i has x−spin-up, so that the proposition p ∧ (q ∨ r) expresses a true statement,
saying that the particle has x−spin-up and simultaneously that i has the spin along the y axis
either up or down—a condition which must be true in virtue of the quantum logical disjunction.
However, given the non-commutativity between these spin operators, [Sx, Sy] 6= 0, it follows
that the two conjunctions “the particle i has x−spin-up and y−spin-up” and “the particle i has
x−spin-up and y−spin-down” are both false; hence, their disjunction false as well. Therefore,
in standard QM the distributive law fails.
On the contrary, this example does not constitute a violation of distributivity in BM. To
show this simple fact, it is sufficient to recall that in the Bohmian context spin measurements
reduce to measurements of particles’ positions. Consequently, the sentence “the particle i has
spin up along the x axis” can be translated into the following proposition:
“the particle i has been found after a x−spin measurement at the position q in the
spatial region ∆, where the detector associated with the state x−spin-up is located”.
Let’s call this statement p′ and assume that p′ is true. Similarly, we can translate the sentences
“the particle i has y−spin-up” with
“the particle i has been found after a y−spin measurement at the position q′ in
the spatial region ∆′, where the detector associated with the state y−spin-up is
located”,
and “the particle i has y−spin-down” with
“the particle has been found after a y−spin measurement at the position q′′ in the
region ∆′′, where the detector associated with the state y−spin-down is located”.
Let us call these statements q′ and r′ respectively. Clearly in these cases we require that these
regions are mutually disjoint—∆∩∆′ = ∅,∆∩∆′′ = ∅,∆′ ∩∆′′ = ∅, and therefore q 6= q′ 6= q′′.
Since the property of being spatially localized necessarily forbids that a particle is simul-
taneously in two places, and given that in BM we employ the classical disjunction, it follows
that the l.h.s side of the distributivity law p′ ∧ (q′ ∨ r′) expresses a false statement, stating
that the particle i has position q and simultaneously has position either q′ or q′′, but since all
these positions are mutually incompatible, it is not the case that a Bohmian particle can be
simultaneously in more than one of such locations. Analogously, the r.h.s. of the distributivity
law (p′ ∧ q′)∨ (p′ ∧ r′) is false as well, given that it claims that the particle i has simultaneously
position q and q′ or simultaneously position q and q′′, which is obviously impossible. Conse-
quently, being both sides of the distributivity law false, the bi-conditional is true in virtue of the
truth table of this logical operator. Therefore, the distributivity law is valid in this example,
as showed by its truth table below:
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Fig. 5: Truth table of the distributivity law. The red line represents the truth value of the
statements discussed in the above example.
Another example in which distributivity holds in BM is given by the following statements
p = “the particle i has location q in space at a certain time t” and vi = “the particle i has
velocity vi at t”, where i = 1, . . . , n correspond to the different values the velocity can take. As
already stressed, in BM velocity is a secondary property of the Bohmian corpuscles, since it is
the first derivative of position over time, then, it is a property attributable to the particles. If
we assume that p is true, the statement
p ∧ (v1 ∨ v2,∨ · · · ∨ vn) = (p ∧ v1) ∨ (p ∧ v2) ∨ · · · ∨ (p ∧ vn)
will be true as well, since one of the disjuncts corresponds to the exact properties of the particle
i at a given time t, therefore both sides of the distributivity law are true also in this specific
case, contrary to the case of standard quantum theory (in which such a statement would be
meaningless!).
In sum, we can conclude our analysis claiming that Bohmian mechanics “is entirely classical
at the level of kinematics (particles moving in space and time), and which is quantum only as
regards its ‘new dynamics’ (as in the title of de Broglie’s paper). Thus, the way de Broglie-Bohm
theory explains the effectiveness of classical logic at the macroscopic level is that it is already
the logic that is operative at the hidden (‘untestable’) level of the particles” (Bacciagaluppi
(2009), p. 71). Concluding, in this section we showed in the first place that the Bohmian
framework implements a classical logical structure at the level of its primitive ontology. This
fact is sufficient to explain why the classical connectives maintain their meanings, without
the need to introduce neither new quantum connectives, nor alternative interpretations of the
logical operators. In the second place, we claimed that the distributive law is not violated in
the context of Bohmian mechanics.
5 Conclusion
In this essay we asked whether quantum physics necessarily implies a revision of the classical
propositional calculus, or if it possible to restore a classical logical picture in the quantum
domain. We answered in the positive to this question. Analyzing the primitive ontology of
Bohmian mechanics and its theory of measurement, we provided a simple explanation of the
reasons for which the propositions about Bohmian particles generate a classical logical struc-
ture. More precisely, we argued that statements about experiments and assertions regarding
observables reduce to—i.e. are translatable into—propositions concerning the particle configu-
ration of a certain experimental situation governed by the dynamical laws (1)-(4). Building on
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this fact, we claimed that in BM the logical connectives retain their classical meanings. As a
consequence, the distributivity law holds in this theoretical framework.
Another interesting consequence of this result is that one can provide a justification for the
classical logical structure which is generally valid in the macroscopic regime. Given that (i) in
a Bohmian universe the macroscopic world is ontologically reduced to—thus, metaphysically
dependent upon—the configurations of particles’ and their deterministic dynamics, and (ii)
these generate a classical propositional calculus, it follows that such a logic will be maintained
at the macroscopic regime. However, we invite the reader to consider the validity of the present
argument with grain of salt, since we did not enter in discussion about the empirical nature of
logic.
In sum, from the discussion contained in Sections 3 and 4, we can conclude that the classical
logic underlying BM should be interpreted as a further consequence of the theory’s primitive
ontology. Thus, Bohmian mechanics constitutes a counterexample to those claims for which
quantum physics necessarily implies a revision of logic. This notable feature of the PO of this
theory unfortunately has not been emphasized in the literature, and we hope to have, at least
partially, filled this lacuna. Moreover, it would be an interesting future work to try to extend
the present analysis of BM in order to understand the logical structure of other well-known
PO theories such as Bohm’s original pilot-wave theory or the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory
implementing a flash and matter density ontology. In particular, it is less trivial to establish
what sort of logical structure underlies Bohm’s pilot-wave theory and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber
with matter density ontology, since both frameworks admit the possibility to have superpositions
of the ψ-field on the one hand, and the matter density field on the other, both entities defined
in physical space. In this manner, it will be possible to investigate in more detail whether
the rehabilitation of classical logic in quantum context is a general consequence of all theories
implementing a clear primitive ontology.
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